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"The labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article of
commerce."l
"The comparative advantage of workers in poor countries is cheap
labor."2
The current proposals over immigration reform, which include a broad
expansion of temporary labor programs to bring more "guestworkers" to the
United States, took place in an age of increased labor commodification.3 The
above quotes represent the two poles of the dilemma that guestworkers face
which frames this Article. In the current political debate about immigration
reform, the term "guestworkers" has been given various meanings, including
providinf temporary status for undocumented immigrants already in the
country. This Article focuses on "guestworker" programs that seek to bring
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10 and II editors of The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice for inviting me to their annual
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1. The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914).
2. CHARLES WHELAN, NAKED ECONOMICS: UNDRESSING THE DISMAL SCIENCE 201 (2002).
3. See BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY 10-11 (2006) (describing H.R. 4437 and the Senate bill that included a guestworker
program); EDWARD J.W. PARK & JOHN S.W. PARK, PROBATIONARY AMERICANS: CONTEMPORARY
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE SHAPING OF ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 108-14 (2005)
(describing current guestworker proposals, balancing flexibility with efficiency).
4. See George Lakoff & Sam Ferguson, The Framing of Immigration (2006),
http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/research/rockridge/immigration (describing the "framing" of
immigration). Of course, the proponents of more liberal immigration policies also use language
liberally in pushing "earned legalization" rather than "amnesty." See Edwin Meese Ill, An Amnesty
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unskilled workers into the United States on a temporary basis.5 This Article
describes the lack of bargaining power and voice that guestworkers have on
the global labor market-and how this lack of bargaining power leads the
workers to be treated like commodities in international trade, widening the
democratic deficit both globally and within the United States. International
labor agreements and human rights instruments may provide some
protection for guestworkers, but the best solution is to have fewer
guestworker programs, rather than to expand them as current legislation
proposes.
This Article views guestworker programs as leading to the
commodification of labor and a widening of the democracy deficit.
Guestworkers are commodified because they are treated as articles of trade
without bargaining power or voice in the substantive transaction. Their
inherently temporary nature makes guestworkers unable to enforce their
legal rights. Further, they are unlikely to leverage their collective bargaining
power to obtain better working conditions or ability to stay in the United
States permanently. Temporary workers have no voice in their new country,
less influence with their country of origin, and no voice at work if they are
unable to enforce their rights. This is why any guestworker program that
cycles workers through on a temporary basis-even one that purports to
grant workers the same rights as U.S. residents-is bound to commodify
guestworkers and exacerbate the democracy deficit.
"Commodification" is the idea that in a market economy everything,
from body parts to knowledge, can be bought and sold.6 Indeed, in the
current economy it is hard to think of anything that is not commodified,
including pain and suffering. 7 Developments in law and society in the last
by Any Other Name, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2006, at A27.
5. Highly skilled temporary workers face potential exploitation and lack of bargaining
power, but they generally have more bargaining power than low-skilled workers. For this reason, I
am limiting my analysis to unskilled temporary workers, including those currently working legally in
the United States under such programs as the H-2A and H-2B programs.
6. Intellectual labor, in particular, is becoming more valuable in the global economy. See
David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property,
Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1143-45 (2005) (describing the
sometimes close connection between race and commodification, even in the intellectual property
domain); see also Anthony Paul Farley, The Apogee of the Commodity, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1229,
1230 (2004) (describing the connection between labor and commodification). Traditional contract
law doctrine has been utilized more frequently in high-tech settings by employers seeking to protect
their "investment" in certain workers. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 27-40 (2003).
7. See Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalcuable, Incommensurable, and
Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 282-91 (2006); Mary Anne
Case, Pets or Meat, 80 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1129 (2005) (discussing the comrnodification of affection
for pets); Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation:
Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 257, 258 (2002) (discussing commodification of human sperm and eggs).
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fifty years have chipped away at the de-commodification of labor that aimed
to give workers greater agency and bargaining power in transactions
regarding their own labor.8 This Article discusses how the laws protecting
collective action are now swimming upstream in a globalized economy
where workers, particularly immigrant and foreign workers, are seen as
articles of commerce without bargaining power; thus, labor is being re-
commodified.
On a global scale, workers have lost significant bargaining power over
the last fifty years as barriers to trade have been removed.9 Historically, the
concept of "comparative advantage" in international trade referred to
commodities such as natural resources or raw materials that countries could
trade with each other in the global marketplace.' 0 The new source of
comparative advantage in the global economy is cheap labor.11 Recent
interest in the United States in an expanded guestworker program
exemplifies this commodification of labor. Countries jockey for position in
the global marketplace to offer the cheapest labor to multinational
corporations.
Trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") privilege the protection of investment over the protection of
labor. 12 The commodification of labor mutes the voice of the workers who
will be most affected by these trade negotiations. This can be seen in the
recent negotiations between the United States and Mexico for a guestworker
program.l13 The potential guestworkers are treated as commodities without
8. For example, the Clayton Act of 1914 explicitly stated that "the labor of a human being is
not a commodity or an article of commerce." Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914). The
National Labor Relations Act, enacted twenty-one years later in 1935, gave legal protection to
collective bargaining, thus providing voice to workers. National Labor Relations Act, Section 7, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
9. See generally BETH SHULMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF WORK: How Low WAGE JOBS FAIL 30
MILLION AMERICANS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2003); ANDY STERN, A COUNTRY THAT WORKS:
GETTING AMERICA BACK ON TRACK (2006).
10. See David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in THE WORKS
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 11-20 (Piero Saffa & M.H. Dobb eds., 1970).
11. As Carlos Fuentes wrote in his fictional novel, THE CRYSTAL FRONTIER, "Mexico [is]
exporting more labor than cement or tomatoes." Carlos Fuentes, The Crystal Frontier, in THE
CRYSTAL FRONTIER 166, 167 (1997).
12. See Eric Tucker, "Great Expectations" Defeated? The Trajectory of Collective
Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States Post-NAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
97, 104-05 (2004); see also Sanford E. Gaines, NAFTA As a Symbol on the Border, 51 UCLA L.
REv. 143, 167-70 (2003).
13. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM, THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY 3 (2004).
In particular, I conceptualize migration policymaking as a two-stage, two-level game.
In the first stage, Congress and the president negotiate over legislation, with the
President playing a subordinate but significant role by introducing legislation, shaping
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agency or an interest in the outcome of agreements between countries. 14
This Article finds lacking the theories of virtual representation that may
close the "democracy deficit" between the workers' interests and the
imperatives of international trade and politics.
By definition, guestworkers have little bargaining power in determining
their employment conditions. Specifically, they have the choice between
destitution in their home countries and temporary work in the United States.
The material benefits of working in the United States should not be
underestimated, but these benefits do nothing to provide guestworkers with a
say in their employment conditions. This Article argues that in order for
workers to have bargaining power in the inevitable global market for labor,
they must be given a voice in the negotiations over trade agreements through
representatives of their own choosing. Further, this Article argues that
guestworker status is fundamentally incompatible with the ability to exercise
meaningful bargaining power over their labor conditions.
Part II of this Article will discuss three theoretical phenomena that
frame the analysis: the commodification of labor, globalization, and the
democracy deficit. The commodification of labor is a long-term historical
process that extends directly from slavery and moves through the history of
the labor movement with its goal of de-commodification. Globalization
complicates de-commodification precisely because knowledge and
intangible labor are so highly valued today. 15 In the global economy,
workers would have more freedom of movement if they were considered to
be goods rather than people. The democracy deficit refers to the global
institutions, such as trade agreements, that are negotiated by governments
often without the input of the people who are most affected by them.
Recently, scholars have argued for the creation of global administrative legal
institutions to close the democracy deficit. 16 On the domestic front,
guestworkers are by nature unrepresented in their new country, and their
home country representatives often have little incentive to represent fully
their interests. Thus, increasing the presence of a large number of noncitizen
the public debate, and potentially vetoing bills .... In addition, migrant-sending states
may influence policymaking at either stage, including through traditional lobbying
efforts, by influencing migrations outcomes directly, and/or by linking U.S. policy to
other bilateral issues.
Id.
14. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH
LAW REFORM 129-82 (2004) (discussing the implications of the globalizing state for law reform).
15. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 373-74 (2005) (discussing "technological determinism").
16. See AMAN, supra note 14, at 129-81 (2004) (arguing for an administrative law solution
to globalization problems); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale:
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1523-41 (2006) (proposing a new
administrative law framework for global problems).
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workers will only exacerbate the democracy deficit.
Part III will examine guestworker programs in light of the dilemmas
posed by commodification. There have been legislative proposals and high-
level negotiations between the United States and Mexico regarding a
guestworker program for all sectors of the United States economy. These
negotiations take place between the heads of state of the two countries,
Presidents Bush and Fox, but do not involve the workers who would be
directly affected by these countries. 17 Congress is currently considerin
elements of these proposals in comprehensive immigration reform.18
Potential guestworkers in countries other than Mexico, however, are unable
to influence democratically these legislative proposals. Instead, the workers
are treated as commodities to be traded between countries. The
commodification of workers adds another dimension to the moral problems
inherent in guestworker programs. These moral objections as well as the
economic, policy, and historical problems with guestworker programs are
examined in Part IV.
Part IV will look at the current state of workers in the global economy
and how the "democracy deficit" affects the voice of global workers. Trade
agreements such as NAFTA place a higher value on goods than people, so
again workers are faced with a choice-seek equal status with goods and 'as
protection of the "investment" of private actors or seek protection based on
their own human dignity and international human rights principles. Despite
the many objections to guestworker programs, they will likely continue to
exist in one form or another. Part V will conclude this Article with ways to
make these programs more responsive to workers to narrow the democracy
deficit. 19
Finally, before beginning my discussion of guestworkers, I should
mention the facets of immigration and temporary labor that this Article will
not discuss. First, while many of the issues affecting the undocumented also
overlap with guestworkers, this Article will not focus directly on the labor
rights of the estimated twelve million undocumented workers. Second, this
17. See generally Camille J. Bosworth, Guest Worker Policy: A Critical Analysis
of President's Bush's Proposed Reform, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (2005); Kristi L. Morgan,
Evaluating Guest Worker Programs in the U.S.: A Comparison of the Bracero Program and
President Bush's Proposed Immigration Reform Plan, 15 La RAZA L.J. 125 (2004); Shannon Leigh
Vivian, Be Our Guest: A Review of the Legal and Regulatory History of U.S. Immigration Policy
Toward Mexico and Recommendations for Combating Employer Exploitation of Nonimmigrant and
Undocumented Workers, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 189 (2005).
18. See generally Judith Golub, Immigration Reform Post 9/11, 13 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 9 (2005).
19. See William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for
International Labor Standards, 80 NEB. L. REV. 715, 750-51 (2001); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 987, 996-98 (1995).
20. For a discussion on the size of the undocumented population, see JEFFREY S. PASSEL,
PEW HISPANIC CENTER, SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
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Article will not discuss guestworker programs in countries other than the
United States, except to note that such programs have seen mixed results. 2 1
Finally, while the labor market effects of greatly expanded guestworker
programs have been hotly debated, this Article makes no claim about how
guestworkers will affect wages and unemployment for workers who are
already here. 22 This Article will, however, touch on how both existing and
proposed unskilled temporary worker programs in the United States will
affect the enforcement of labor rights for all workers and how the
introduction of a large number of workers, who are essentially unable to
organize, negatively affects the bargaining power of all workers.
II. COMMODIFICATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT
All labor can be regarded as a commodity to be bought and sold. The
history of the labor movement in many respects is the struggle to obtain the
maximum price for labor that the market will bear.23 Labor history is also,
however, the story of the movement for greater voice and respect in the
terms and conditions of employment; essentially for greater bargaining
power in labor transactions. 24 This is the story of labor de-commodification.
This Article examines three modem, interrelated phenomena about
guestworkers: (1) the commodification of labor, (2) globalization, and (3)
the democracy deficit.
A. Commodification of Labor in Historical Context
The traditional notion of a commodity is a good or material that can be
bought or sold in the market. 25 As trade between countries began in earnest
in the late 1700s, economist David Ricardo identified the theory of
POPULATION IN THE U.S. (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?
ReportlD=61.
21. Compare MANUEL GARCiA Y GRIEGO, CANADA: FLEXIBILITY AND CONTROL IN
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, IN CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 119
(Wayne Cornelius et al. eds., 1994) (describing the successes of the Candaian guestworker program),
with KITTY CALAVITA, IMMIGRANTS AT THE MARGINS: LAW, RACE, AND EXCLUSION IN SOUTHERN
EUROPE 42-43, 46 (2005) (analyzing problems with guestworker programs in Spain and Italy).
22. For a sampling of the debate among economists, particularly George Borjas and David
Card, see Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y TIMES MAGAZINE, July 9, 2006, at 36.
23. See generally JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983); HOWARD KIMELDORF, BATTLING FOR AMERICAN LABOR: WOBBLIES, CRAFT WORKERS,
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNION MOVEMENT (1999).
24. See generally NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN
LABOR (2003).
25. Webster's Dictionary defines "commodity" as an "article of commerce ... something
useful or valued." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 106 (1998).
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comparative advantage. 26 Comparative advantage is the idea that increased
trade benefits all countries in the world because each nation has a
comparative advantage in some commodity over another. Thus, countries
that did not have certain types of raw materials could trade things that they
did have with other countries. In the end, so the theory goes, everyone is
better off. 27 This theory underlies much of international trade today.2 8
In the late nineteenth century Karl Marx examined the commodification
of labor. 29 This was the idea that labor had an inherent value that could be
traded on the open market.30 This was called the surplus value of labor.3 1
Marx believed that labor had to have value in order for workers to claim an
32ownership interest in the outputs of capital. Marx also critiqued the
commodification of labor because it reduced everything to an economic
transaction, what he called the "fetishism of the commodities." 3 3 Marx also
made clear, however, that a commodity was an "object outside us, a thing
that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another." 34 Thus,
the commodity and the economic unit of labor, or the outputs, had to exist
outside the individual.
Marx's conception of commodification was only the beginning for
many of the scholars who followed. Commodification is now viewed not as
a dichotomous "either-or" question, but rather as a continuum running from
full commodification to partial or incomplete commodification. 35 Modem
commodification theorists focus on not whether or not to commodify, but
instead on the fairness of the transaction and the relative bargaining power
of the parties to the transaction. 36 Although workers will always be
26. Ricardo, supra note 10, at 11-20.
27. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15 at 225-27 (2005) (concluding that Ricardo is right about
the theory of comparative advantage).
28. See WHELAN, supra note 2, at 21.
29. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 191, 308-19 (Robert




33. Arjun Appadurai, Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 4 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986).
34. Id. at 7.
35. See Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 543, 556-62 (2004).
36. See, e.g., Miranda Joseph, The Multivalent Commodity: On the Supplementarity of Value
and Values, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 383
(Martha M. Ertman and Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (describing theories of the commodification of
labor); Joan C. Williams & Vivian Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That is NOT the
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essentially selling their labor, the goal is to make the transaction as fair as
possible for the parties involved. In an ongoing employment context, anti-
commodification theory also means having the voice to protect oneself and
enforce legal protections enacted for their benefit.
Modem writers on economics, globalization, and international trade
have applied the theory of comparative advantage to the labor relationship. 37
In the new economy, where businesses roam the globe looking for labor,
there is little doubt that labor is a valuable commodity in the global
marketplace. Feminist theorists have also struggled with commodification. 38
The unpaid labor of female caretakers in the home has posed a dilemma for
feminist theorists. 39 While women have contributed a great deal of unpaid
labor to the economy in the form of household labor and family caretaking,
compensation and monetization of family caregiving reduce acts of love to
economic transactions.40 Margaret Jane Radin, Joan Williams, and Martha
Fineman have attempted to address the dichotomy between paid work and
caregiving, among other forms of commodification. 4 1 In some ways, the
dichotomy has been addressed by change in the economy, with more women
participating in the paid labor force.42
Not all theorists struggle with the commodification of labor. For
example, the commodification of labor is not problematic to law and
economics theorists. 43 New commodification theorists also accept that
Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 362
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (arguing that in the modem economy, the debate
is not about whether commodification will occur but on what and whose terms).
37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15; WHELAN, supra note 2.
38. See Bridget Anderson, Just Another Job? The Commodification of Domestic Labor in
GLOBAL WOMAN, NANNIES, MAIDS AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 104, 113 (Barbara
Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild, eds, 2003).
39. See generally MICHELLE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
BODY PARTS (2006); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); Katherine Silbaugh,
Commodification and Women's Household Labor, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HoMo ECONOMICUS:
GENDER, LAW AND SOCIETY 338 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
40. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Bridget
Anderson, Just Another Job? The Commodification of Domestic Labor, in GLOBAL WOMAN,
NANNIES, MAIDS AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 104 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie
Russell Hochschild eds., 2003).
41. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (2004); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
(AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT) (2000); RADIN, supra note 40.
42. In 2005, women comprised forty-six percent of the workforce and are "projected to
account for fifty-one percent of the increase in total labor force growth between 2004 and 2014."
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, 2005 Annual
Averages and the Monthly Labor Review, November 2005, available at http://www.dol.gov/wb
/factsheets/Qf-laborforce-05.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
43. See Elisabeth Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, in
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commodification is inevitable to some degree. 44 This Article seeks to
specify the conditions that lessen the commodification of guestworkers.
History shows workers progressively gaining more bargaining power over
the terms and conditions of their employment over the last two centuries.4 5
That progress has been threatened in recent years by increased trade and
manufacturing in areas where economic deprivation has decreased workers'
bargaining power, and collective bargaining to increase wages is
complicated by a lack of protection for freedom of association. 46
Modem commodification theory attempts to recognize the
complications of resisting commodification in a global economy where
nearly everything is monetized.4 7 Native Americans use intellectual property
law in order to prevent the degradation of their heritage by sports teams, but
they must choose between making much needed profit from the symbols or
stopping their use outright.48 The reproductive capacity of women is valued
by many who cannot procreate, and thus, women, particularly the
economically stressed, face the choice of whether to put their eggs on the
global market.49
While theorizing about property interests in body parts and organs has
caused new commodification theorists to confront difficult questions,50 the
commodification of labor has led to even more complicated theories. For
example, when is a worker in the modem economy fully commodified, as
one who is trafficked or held in slavery, and when is a worker only partially
commodified, such as a janitor, low wage worker, or undocumented
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 46 (Martha M.
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
44. See Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of
Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND
CULTURE 8 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
45. While the number of workers organized in unions has been falling in recent years, the
number of statutes protecting worker rights has actually increased. This has been particularly true at
the state level, such as in California. See, e.g., Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, CAL. LAB.
CODE § 2698 (2006) (allowing workers to sue for violations of the labor laws).
46. See LANCE COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS'
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS 71 (2d ed. 2004) (citing reports documenting the rise in violations of workers' rights in
the 1980s).
47. See Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Freedom, Equality, and the Many Futures
of Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND
CULTURE 1-2 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
48. Sarah Harding, Culture, Commodification and Native American Cultural Patrimony, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 137 (Martha M.
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
49. See Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 54-55.
50. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 26 (2004) (describing what
Marx called "commodification" as containing certain limits on the sale of babies, for example).
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immigrant whose health and safety are disregarded? 5 1 This Article argues
that the test of commodification is the extent to which workers have
bargaining power and voice over the substantive terms of their
employment. 52 In the case of guestworkers, leverage might include being
able to obtain permanent residency in the United States.
In the contemporary labor context, commodification is about the lack of
voice in the political sphere and in the workplace. 53 This lack of voice in the
political sphere widens the democracy deficit. Another immediate
consequence of the lack of voice is the inability to change working
conditions either with the employer or with the government. The lack of
voice at work has been exacerbated by the declining number of workers
represented by unions in the United States.54 The large number of workers
who are marginalized because they are undocumented or lacking full time
employment is lessening the bargaining power for all workers. 55
Workers, and guestworkers in particular, face difficulty in maximizing
the full value of their labor, as will be shown in the following section.
Nevertheless, the bargaining position of workers in the global economy will
be affected by the basic laws of supply and demand. Because there is a large
supply of workers globally, wages have stagnated.56 But, based on the
apparent need for guestworkers to fill jobs within this country, temporary
workers would seem to have a great deal of bargaining power. Given the
public discourse of immigration reform, it would seem that guestworkers are
51. See LANCE COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR: WORKERS'
RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS (2005).
52. Marion Crain has described the commodification of professional workers that comes
from lack of voice as a result of legal decisions that strip workers of collective bargaining rights. See
generally Crain, supra note 35.
53. See Crain, supra note 35, at 601. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE &
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO THE DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970) (explaining
how voice is sometimes a more effective mechanism than exit in changing organizations).
54. See RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.
LABOR MOVEMENT 2 (2006) (citing Hirsch and Macpherson's compilations for the figure that union
membership has decreased in the private sector from twenty-four percent in 1973 to eight percent in
2005). For more statistics on union membership over the past twenty years, see Unionstats.com,
Union Membership and Coverage Database From the CPS (Documentation), available at
http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
55. See DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE N AMERICA 113-14 (2005)
("Being undocumented is precarious. Fearing deportation, you will think twice about contesting your
wages or working conditions.").
56. See THE ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007,
(2006), available at http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/intro-exec.htm (discussing the
stagnation of wages in the United States since 2000). This stagnation affects the wages of all
workers, as argued by the AFL-CIO in its petition with the United States Trade Representative over
labor rights violations in China. Petition of the AFL-CIO with the United States Trade




badly needed in the American economy. 57 Nevertheless, guestworkers have
little leverage to negotiate terms and conditions of employment, which
might include permanent residency in the United States.
The law has recognized a historic trajectory from simple
commodification to voice. From the post-Civil War Reconstruction era
through the mid-twentieth century, American law formally rejected the idea
of human labor as property, an idea that had existed since the founding of
the country. 58 The Constitution's Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery and
involuntary servitude in 1865. 59 Nearly fifty years later, in 1914, the U.S.
Congress declared that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce" in the Clayton Antitrust Act.60 While the practical
reason for this section of the Clayton Act was to exempt labor negotiations
from antitrust liability, the Clayton Act was also a component of the legal
rejection of the commodification of human labor that began with the
abolition of slavery in the 1860s. 6 1 The National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") of 1935 also rejected the commodification of labor by protecting
the right to associate and bargain collectively. 62 Since 1919, the United
States has also assumed obligations as a member of the International Labor
Organization, which has a preamble that rejects the idea that labor is a
commodity. 63
B. Globalization Heightens the Commodification of Labor
Globalization refers to the movement of people, as well as goods,
across borders. Globalization is not a new process, but it is marked in the
modem era by an increasing income inequality between countries. 64 The
57. One example of the true need for guestworkers is the advocacy of Tamar Jacoby of the
Manhattan Institute, a traditionally conservative think tank. See Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 50.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
60. The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914).
61. See Brown v. Pro Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 253 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The policy behind the statutory labor exemption protects the right of workers to act collectively to
seek better wages ....").
62. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, cmt. 16 (1935). On the labor exemption,
see Brown, 518 U.S. at 253 (1996).
63. International Labour Organization, Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/downloadlbrochure/pdf/page5.pdf ("Labour is not a
commodity.").
64. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 25 (2002) (describing
the challenge, upon assuming the presidency of the World Bank in 1997, of "1.2 billion people
around the world living on less than a dollar a day," and "2.8 billion people living on less than $2 a
day").
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global income gap has led many to seek work in the developed world, even
while many opportunities are being shipped out of developed countries. 65
The neoliberal paradigm assumes that everything can be freely traded.6 6
Guestworkers fit into this paradigm as another article to be traded. The rise
of free trade agreements marks the global economy in the twenty-firstcentury.67 These trade agreements aim to break down trade barriers,
eliminate tariffs on imports, and increase global competition among
unskilled workers. 68
In his book, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First
Century, Thomas L. Friedman heralds the "flattening" of the world, or the
leveling of the playing field through technology, which has allowed billions
of new workers to compete for the jobs of United States workers. 69 Through
call centers in Mumbai and in other parts of the world, workers in
developing countries are competing with American workers, who must
either "skill up" through improved education and training or face fewer
opportunities.7  Contrary to Friedman's "flat world," guestworkers find
many barriers to mobility and residency in the global labor marketplace. 7 1
Thus, while the value of immigrant workers to the economy may be high,
this value is not reflected in the actual bargaining power of guestworkers in
their working conditions or the ability to gain residency in the United States,
as this Article will show.
State and federal domestic labor regulation has historically affected the
bargaining power of workers two ways. First, the National Labor Relations
65. See Dean Hubbard, What Kind of Globalization? Organizing for Workers' Human
Rights, 9 WORKINGUSA 315, 318 (2006).
66. See Steven R. Weisman, Financial Leaders Gather, A Bit Tensely, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2006, at C9 (describing a proposal to include more input from countries such as China, Mexico, and
Turkey).
67. See Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An Analytical
Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 13, 14 (2003) (describing trade agreements between the
U.S. and Chile, the U.S. and Singapore). Examples of recent trade agreements include the United
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909; United States-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 948.
68. See MICHAEL D. YATES, NAMING THE SYSTEM: INEQUALITY AND WORK IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 21-22 (2003) (describing how free trade policies can lead to economic insecurity among a
majority of the world's population).
69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 22-28.
70. Id. at 21-28.
71. The HI-B program for technology workers offers some ability to petition for residency
with the help of an employer, but that program has been plagued by delays and limitations. Workers
in that program, because of the need to be tied to one employer, lack the full mobility that Friedman
touts. David N. Pellow & Glenna Matthews, Immigrant Workers in Two Eras: Struggles and
Successes in Silicon Valley, in CHALLENGING THE CHIP: LABOR RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 129 (2005) (describing the difficulties of
organizing in Silicon Valley because of the largely temporary workforce).
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Act of 1935 (NLRA) mandated the procedures that would have to be
followed by workers and employers. 72 The NLRA requires American
employers to bargain in good faith with representatives of employees. 73
Second, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 set the minimum
standards for negotiations, such as minimum wage and overtime laws. 74
Neither the NLRA nor the FLSA explicitly apply to work relationships that take
place outside the country. 75 Although the International Labour Organization
promulgates conventions on freedom of association, the global economy is
notable for its lack of enforceable procedures and standards governing
collective bargaining. 76 Instead, multilateral trade agreements such as
NAFTA and the new Central American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA")
presume that there will be no enforceable standards in labor transactions
between countries; instead, NAFTA requires that countries enforce their own
labor laws and was not intended to deal with migration.77
Trade agreements are also increasingly becoming part of the global
economy. The signing of NAFTA in 1994 started a series of free trade
agreements that attempted to open trade of goods and services across the
borders. 78 The NAFTA was not intended to deal with the issue of migration.
It did, however, commit the United States, Canada, and Mexico to provide
migrant workers in each country's territory with the same legal protection as
that country's nationals with respect to working conditions.79 Unfortunately,
undocumented immigration from Mexico into the United States only
increased in the twelve years since NAFTA has been enacted.8 °
72. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
74. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
75. Stephen B. Moldof, The Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Activities and Employees
outside the United States, 17 LAB. LAWYER 417, 423 (2002).
76. LANCE COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 44-
46 (2000) (describing the ILO framework).
77. Sarah Paoletti, Making Visible the Invisible: Globalization's Impact on Workers in the
United States, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 126 (2006).
78. Congress recently passed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),
which focuses on the countries south of Mexico and north of Panama, as well as the Dominican
Republic. In the last fifteen years the United States has also entered into a number of bilateral free
trade agreements (FTAs) such as the U.S-Chile FTA and the U.S.-Jordan FTA. See Sandra Polaski,
supra note 67, at 14.
79. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., principle 11, Sept.
14, 1993, 32, I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
80. For example, when the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was enacted in
1986, an estimated 3.6 million people were legalized under the amnesty provisions of that law. The
number of people who might qualify for legalization under the proposal considered by the Senate in
2006 would be closer to 10-12 million people, based on numbers provided by the Pew Hispanic
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In the global economy, trafficking is becoming an increasing problem. 8 1
One of the ironies of the global era is that as the world has focused increased
attention on the fight against human trafficking while the terminology used
in the immigration debate tracks the idea that immigrants can be traded or
imported like goods.8 2 Several significant pieces of legislation have been
passed to combat the spread of human trafficking, in which humans are
smuggled like contraband.83
At the same time that trafficking is seen as a major problem, trading
workers as commodities has been looked upon as commonplace, a necessary
byproduct of the global economy. 84 The debate about a new guestworker
program has also used the language of "importing workers." 85 Several
commentators on all sides of the political debate have decried the "importing
of guestworkers" embodied in various legislative proposals.86 In the context
of legal guestworker programs that are in place in the Northern Mariana
Islands, government officials criticized the "importation of guestworkers"
that was occurring instead of a regulated immigration scheme. 87 Thus, the
Center. According to Pew, unauthorized migrant families were comprised of 13.9 million people in
2004, of which 4.7 million were children. Of the 4.7 million children, 3.1 million were United States
Citizens. PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS
(2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.
81. See Jennifer M. Chacon, Misery And Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts
to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2981-82 (2006); Ivy C. Lee & Mie Lewis,
Human Trafficking from a Legal Advocate's Perspective: History, Legal Framework and Current
Anti-Trafficking Efforts, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 169, 188-93 (2003); Dennis Wagner,
Phoenix's Hidden $2 Billion Industry, Human Smuggling; Vicious Organizations Move Thousands
of Immigrants Through Valley Every Day, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 23, 2006, at I (describing
human smuggling as a $2 billion a year business); Bernice Yeung, Trafficked: How Three Attorneys
Rescued a Former Sex Slave from Deportation, CAL. LAW., Dec. 2004, at 31 (telling the story of a
trafficking victim).
82. Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks upon the Release of the Sixth Annual
Trafficking in Persons Report (June 5, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2006/67551.htm ("Defeating human trafficking is a great moral calling of our time and under
President Bush's leadership the United States is leading a new abolitionist movement to end the
sordid trade in human beings.").
83. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7103 (2000).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Philip Martin, There is Nothing More Permanent Than Temporary Foreign
Workers, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 2001, available at http://www.cis.org/
articles/2001/back50l.html ("Importing guest workers-some of whom will settle-in such a
situation is analogous to importing mine workers just before the ore runs out."); Ruben Navarette,
Here We Go Again, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2006, at 13A ("I'm talking about importing hundreds of
thousands of new foreign workers from a country such as Mexico to work in farming, construction,
hotels or restaurants."); Robert J. Samuelson, We Don 't Need 'Guest Workers,' WASH. POST, Mar.
21,2006, at A21.
87. S. REP. NO. 106-24, at 32 (1999), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong-reports&docid=f:sr204.106.pdf ("The INA reflects the American
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connection between temporary labor programs and imports is firmly rooted.
Linguist Otto Santa Ana has described the rhetoric surrounding illegal
immigration, studying the media's treatment of Proposition 187.88 In his
study, Santa Ana found that undocumented immigrants were most often
portrayed as animals in the press.89 In 1994, the Los Angeles Times reported
that "employers hungering for really cheap labor hunt out the foreign
workers." 90 Federal officials in the mid-1990s, according to Santa Ana,
called for increased border patrols to "ferret out" immigrants. 9 1 With images
such as these in the popular press, it is easier for Americans to see both legal
and illegal immigrants as lacking any rights.
Other linguists have discussed the importance of framing in political
discourse.92 What is the importance of framing guestworkers as goods to be
imported? This Article will argue that this frame leads to a conception of
guestworkers as lacking any agency in the terms and conditions of their
employment. The frame also leads to the missing connection between
guestworkers and human rights principles, which will be discussed later in
this Article. Finally, commodification of labor leads to apathy concerning
guestworkers' lack of voice in the political process. Guestworker programs
exacerbate the democracy deficit.
C. The Democracy Deficit: Workers Lacking Voice in Politics and at Work
The "democracy deficit" is a concept that has been used to describe the
increasing importance of unelected institutions in the global environment.
Many argue that the increasing importance of institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund are displacing the democratically
elected institutions in poor countries. Many believe that the democracy
deficit legitimizes and increases the wealth deficit between rich and poor
tradition of employing U.S. workers in private sectorjobs that promote the growth of a middle class,
rather than importing and exploiting a rolling stream of alien workers, without permanent immigrant
status or family ties, in low-paid permanent positions, most to be kept almost all the time on their
employers' premises.").
88. OTTo SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 65-103 (2002).
89. Id. at 83-89.
90. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 386-
88 (2002); Geoffrey Nunberg, Fresh Air Commentary: Aliens, (National Public Radio April 11,
2006), available at http://www-csli.stanford.edu/-nunberg/aliens.html ("[W]e don't usually describe
law-breakers as being illegal in themselves. Jack Abramoff may have done illegal lobbying, but
nobody has called him an illegal lobbyist. And whatever laws Bernie Ebbers and Martha Stewart
may have broken, they weren't illegal CEO's [sic].").
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countries.93 The democracy deficit also applies to the large number of
people, both legal and illegal, who do not currently have the right to vote in
the United States. While the right to vote might legitimately be granted or
withheld based on an individual's immigration status or past crimes, a
growing gap between the represented and the right of the represented to
choose their representatives should be cause for concern. 94
There may be ways to close the gap between people with little political
power and their governments. One of these ways might involve
representative international institutions and nongovernmental organizations,
such as the International Labor Organization ("ILO") and the UN. There are
limitations on the democratic nature of the ILO, however, since the ILO is
an unelected, three-part structure that involves governments, workers, and
employers. 95 This tripartite structure can sometimes lead to the absence of
workers' voices, unless they are virtually represented by unions and
governments. Unions will generally represent the interests of workers, but
with only about thirteen percent of workers in the United States represented
by unions, a significant democracy deficit remains. 96
In analyzing guestworker programs, it is important to exercise caution
about the limitations of democracy theory. The right to vote, for example, is
not the sine qua non of democratic participation. In Spring 2006, over one
million of people, including many noncitizens, marched in reaction to
various Congressional proposals to change immigration laws.97 Their
activism may have had a major impact on the shape of the bill that was
passed by the Senate, which included an earned legalization program and
lacked many of the most draconian components of the House of
Representatives' immigration bill. It remains to be seen whether the large
public demonstrations will have an overall positive or negative impact on
any immigration legislation. The influence of the recent demonstrations,
despite the inability of many immigrants to vote, shows that there are many
93. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 19 (2006) (describing
democratic deficits).
94. Jamin Raskin, Lawful Disenfranchisement: America 's Structural Democracy Deficit, 32
HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE 12 (Spring 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring05/
lawful.html (describing the disenfranchisement of ex-felons).
95. For more information about the ILO structure, see International Labour Organisation,
Structure of the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/depts/fact.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006);
see also Ed Lorenz, Bringing Law to Globalization Through ILO Conventions: A Labor Perspective
on the Core Labor Standards, 11 MICH. ST. U.-D.C.L. J. INT'L L. 101, 103 (2002) (describing the
ILO "tri-partied system of governance").
96. BLS Reports Percentage of Workers in Unions Still 12.5 Percent, But Overall Numbers
Up, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at AA-I (Jan. 23, 2006). The latest Bureau of Labor Statistics
data shows an continually worsening trend. See Union Membership Falls to 12 Percent, SAN DIEGO
UNION -TRIB., Jan. 26, 2007, at 4 (noting that union membership was 35 percent in the mid-1950s.).
97. Hundreds of Thousands Rally Nationwide for Immigrant Rights, Path to Citizenship,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 70, Apr. 12, 2006, at A-2.
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ways to influence policy democratically.
In addition, foreigners living abroad may be "virtually represented" by
their governments through the foreign policy actions of their leaders. In the
case of guestworkers, virtual representation has not worked very well
because low-wage workers usually lack political power in their home
countries. 98 In theory, virtual representation might work, but with the
realities of geopolitics today, world leaders will pay little attention to
workers who are living between two countries.
International institutions can do little to remedy the nonresponsiveness
of government officials to their own people. In Mexico, for example, the
access that poor workers have to their government is defined by the history
of one-party rule in that country.99 The PRI ruled Mexico for eighty-three
years until the PAN won the presidency in 2000.100 Throughout that time,
Mexico became increasingly neoliberal and, in 1994, entered into the
NAFTA.' 0' When investors, protecting their investment, have the ability to
trump national laws, the voice that citizens have in their government is
diminished.
With regard to immigrants and guestworkers, the democracy deficit is
even more pronounced. These workers have the right to vote in their home
countries, unless those countries do not give expatriates the right to vote. 10 2
There are many ways, however, that individuals can engage in political
action besides voting. Immigrants and citizens, for example, took to the
streets throughout the country in May 2006 to make their voices heard on
immigration proposals in Congress. 10 3  Nevetheless, noncitizens are
ineligible to vote in the United States and thus have little ability to influence
98. Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 430-35
(2003) (discussing consent as the revolutionary claim for independence).
99. Enrique De La Garza Toledo, Free Trade and Labor Relations in Mexico, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 227 (Robert J.
Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
100. See ROGER BLANPAIN, ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 211-12 (2007).
101. SHEREEN HERTEL, UNEXPECTED POWER: CONFLICT AND CHANGE AMONG
TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVISTS 101-03 (2006) (describing the changes proposed by President Fox's
labor secretary Ralph Absacal that would make Mexican labor law more business-friendly).
102. Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration
Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2006); Ruth Rubio-Marin, Transnational Politics and the Democratic
Nation-State: Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants,
81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 117, 126-28 (2006).
103. See Randal C. Archibold, Immigrants Take to U.S. Streets in a Show of Strength, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2006, at Al (discussing marches that took place nation-wide on May 1); Immigrants.
Supporters Rally May 1 For Rights, Comprehensive Legislation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 84,
May 2, 2006, at A 11.
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legislation. 10 4 There may be some opportunities to influence legislation
through unions and other activism, but by and large, the political arena is
dominated by large corporate interests, further exacerbating the democracy
deficit. Indeed, immigration reform will likely be shaped by business needs,
thus ensuring expanded guestworker programs into the future.
Generally, representative democracy presumes that governments
respond to the interests of their people through representative institutions.
This theory is embedded in many of the institutions of representative
democracy. 105 Congress and other institutions are intended to represent
voters. Most immigrants are unable to vote and influence their
representatives in their new or home countries. 10 6
Democratic theories rely heavily on the consent of the governed.
Consent theories are also used to justify the commodification of labor, as
they have been used to justify much commodification. 10 7 The idea as
applied to guestworkers is that as long as guestworkers freely choose to
come to the United States, the transaction is substantively not problematic.
Many come to the United States on temporary visas, such as students and
foreign visitors. 10 8 Because they are not able to vote when in the United
States, the "democracy deficit" is thereby increased. Political theorist Joseph
Carens argues that the difference is the amount of time that those visitors are
here. 10 9 Foreign visitors, for example, are only here for a limited amount of
time and rarely have the need for protection from elected representatives.
There are fundamental differences between students, tourists, and
workers. A guestworker's stay in a country can implicate many more legal
rights and remedies than will tourists' or students' stays. Further, because
the State is much more entwined with labor as regulator, employer, and
enforcer, as it was during the Bracero Program, there is a need for workers
104. See Rubio-Marin, supra note 102, at 126-28.
105. Jeremy Waldron, Deliberation, Disagreement and Voting, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 210 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999).
106. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of citizens to vote.
U.S. CONST. amend XV. In some cases, however, the right to vote is available to noncitizens. For
example, Mexicans living in the United States can cast ballots in Mexican elections. Noncitizens
living in certain jurisdictions, such as Takoma Park, Maryland, can vote in local school board
elections. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Legal
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1463 (1993) (describing how the city of
Takoma Park, Maryland, extended the right to vote in local school board elections to noncitizens).
107. See Ertman & Williams, supra note 36, at 3 ("The classic justification of the market is
the idea of freedom of contract.").
108. ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 256-57, Table 12.4 (2004) (H-IB cap was increased for fiscal years
1999 and 2000.).
109. Joseph H. Carens, Citizenship and Civil Society: What Rights for Residents?, in DUAL
NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND THE U.S: THE
REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP 100, 108 (Randall Hanson and Patrick Weil eds., 2002).
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to be able to influence legislation that will directly affect the terms and
conditions of their employment. 1 0 Guestworkers have limited ability to
influence legislation in workplaces that are heavily regulated by the
government.
In response to the need to have a politically active workforce, many
make the argument that workers have freely consented to be guestworkers
and thus there is no need for political participation."' There are several
responses to this argument. First, the bargaining power of guestworkers is
likely to be significantly less than students or technology workers. Further,
students and highly skilled workers have a greater ability to change their
status. Finally, these workers have more powerful, organized constituencies
to look after their interests than do large, diffuse groups that might advocate
on behalf of guestworkers. The agricultural lobby notwithstanding,
temporary labor advocates have been relatively less successful in efforts to
increase the caps on temporary labor programs for non-farm employment. 1 12
III. A MUFFLED VOICE FOR GUESTWORKERS
In the current debate about immigration reform, the term "guestworker"
has been used to mean many different things. In order to have a palatable
legislative proposal containing what many see as "amnesty" for
undocumented workers, a path to citizenship for unauthorized workers has
been called a "guestworker" program. 113 Under various versions of these
proposals, unauthorized workers in the country would be required to register
for a temporary worker program that might lead to legal residency if the
worker met certain conditions, such as paying a fine and back taxes and
learning English. 1 4 In discussing guestworkers, this Article is referring only
to truly temporary labor programs. Unauthorized workers in the United
110. See generally Michael R. Triplett, White House Outlines Immigration Reforms,
Including Guestworker Programs, Worker IDs, Daily Lab. Report (BNA) No. 15, Jan. 24, 2007, at
A-13.
111. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 122-40 (2006) (discussing theorists that separate "membership" in a community from"citizenship").
112. See Cap Reached for H-2B Visas, Homeland Security Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
67, at A-1I1 (Apr. 7, 2006) (discussing how quickly the H-2B visa cap is reached).
113. See, e.g., George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on Immigration
Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0l/20040107-
3.html. Bush took care to distinguish his proposal from an "amnesty." Id. "Those who make th[e]
choice [to apply for citizenship] will be allowed to apply in the normal way .... I oppose amnesty,
placing undocumented workers on the automatic path to citizenship. Granting amnesty encourages
the violation of our laws, and perpetuates illegal immigration." Id.
114. Eric Lekus, Senate Votes to Restore Language Allowing Guestworkers to Self-Petition
for Green Cards, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 97, May 19, 2006, at AA-1.
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States also face commodification and the democracy deficit. Ironically,
though, these workers face fewer obstacles to enforcing their rights than
guestworkers. First, they are more likely to be members of unions because
they often have long-term ties to the United States.11 5 Although they face
the constant possibility of deportation, unauthorized workers are probably
aware of the low likelihood of actual worksite enforcement. Finally, unlike
workers under current temporary programs, unauthorized workers are not
tied to the employer who sponsored them into the United States. 1 16 Thus,
while unauthorized workers certainly face a democracy deficit, the historical
evidence shows that temporary worker programs are even more problematic
for enforcing rights.
A. Historical Lessons: The Problems of the Braceros
Throughout U.S. history, there have been examples of temporary
worker programs that exploited different racial groups. 117 The Bracero
Program, in effect at various times during from 1917 to 1964, formalized a
temporary labor system for agriculture. The Program began during World
War I with approximately 77,000 workers for agricultural labor shortages.118
The Program ramped up again during World War II, but even after the war
was over, growers' purported needs for agricultural workers continued.' 19
From 1942 to 1964 over 4.6 million Mexicans were brought to the United
States through the Bracero Program. 12  Although they were promised
transportation and prevailing wages, they rarely obtained all of these
115. See MILKMAN, supra note 54, at 129 (immigrants have shown more interest in unions
than native-born workers as shown by a study conducted by the University of California Institute for
Labor and Employment).
116. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2000) (describing the petition process of the "importing
employer").
117. See EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, UNEQUAL FREEDOM: How RACE AND GENDER SHAPED
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP AND LABOR 190-96 (2002) (Japanese and Haoles in Hawaii were treated
strictly as laborers, not as settlers and potential citizens. At first, the policy for Asian workers
favored single men free of family ties-this minimized housing costs, and indeed the housing
conditions were very bad-Japanese were brought in as temporary workers from 1870-1930); see
also Shannon Leigh Vivian, Be Our Guest: A Review Of The Legal And Regulatory History Of U.S.
Immigration Policy Toward Mexico And Recommendations For Combating Employer Exploitation
Of Nonimmigrant And Undocumented Workers, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 189, 196-98 (2005).
118. Camille J. Bosworth, Guest Worker Policy: A Critical Analysis of President Bush's
Proposed Reform, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1095-120 (2005).
119. KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR 1820-1924
(1984).
120. JUSTIN AKERS CHACON & MIKE DAVIS, NO ONE IS ILLEGAL: FIGHTING RACISM AND




Moreover, the agreement worked out between the United States and
Mexico encouraged workers to return to Mexico to receive "savings
accounts," which was money deducted from their paychecks in the United
States. 122 The problem was that many of the workers were not able to obtain
access to these accounts and later brought litigation to recover the monies.
Former Braceros brought suit in federal court in 2002 to recover the
withheld funds in a lawsuit titled Cruz v. United States.123 Their claims
against the United States, Mexico, and the various banks were met with a
variety of worthy defenses such as sovereign immunity of nations, the
limited duties owed by banks to depositors, and the statute of limitations. 124
The federal court in Oakland, California dismissed the lawsuit in 2003, but
many of the claims based on state law found new life in legislation to extend
the statute of limitations in the California state legislature. 125 The legislation
showed the Braceros' effectiveness in the democratic system well after the
Program had been terminated, but it was not until the participants in the
Bracero Program were citizen participants in the United States that they had
the ability to enforce basic rights. 126
The Bracero Program and the ensuing litigation displays the democracy
deficit in plain sight. The Bracero Program was a negotiated compromise
between the United States and Mexico, with those directly affected by it
having little or no say in the process. Both the United States and Mexico had
reasons for favoring a temporary worker program, with little thought to how
the plan would work in practice. Once conditions were not as promised in
the United States, the Braceros had no option to exercise their rights. 127
B. H-2A, H-1B, and H-2B Workers
Even though the Bracero Program formally ended in 1964, various
temporary labor programs sprouted from the Immigration and Nationality
121. Id.
122. Cruz v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
123. Cruz v. United States, 2003 WL 21518119 (N.D. Cal. 2003), reconsideration granted
in part, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
124. Id. at 1031-33.
125. Id. at 1032.
126. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 354.7 (West 2006).
127. Perhaps because of the problems they experienced with the Bracero Program, many ex-
Braceros who have been interviewed believe that current guestworker proposals should ensure
higher wages and long-term contracts. Anna Gorman, Ex-Braceros Back Senate Plan, But With
Upgrades, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at BI.
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Act of 1965.128 The most often used of these programs are the H-2A and H-
1 B programs. 129 The H-2A program is intended to bring workers on a
temporary basis to work in agriculture. 130 The H-iB program is intended
mostly for technology workers. H-2A programs have been more prone to
abuse because of the lesser bargaining power that agricultural workers have
compared to other workers in society.' 33
By definition, guestworker programs are temporary and respond to
actual labor market needs. 132 Several historical and current guestworker
programs have satisfied neither of these conditions. 133 The Bracero Program
has been one of the most prominent examples. There also continues to be
debate about whether there is an actual shortage of agricultural labor. 134 In
the absence of a Bracero Program, Congress enacted a patchwork of
temporary labor programs in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
with an alphabet soup of designations (HI-A, Hi-B, H2-A, and H-2B)
corresponding to the different sections of the Code. 135 Even in these
programs, the labor certification process managed by the Department of
Labor has been criticized for overstating actual labor shortages.' 3 6 Thus,
temporary programs to address labor shortages have rarely been temporary
or in response to actual labor shortages.
The abuses in these contemporary guestworker programs have been
highlighted by recent NAFTA complaints. In February 2003, the
Farmworker Justice Program filed a complaint under the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, the side agreement to the NAFTA that
protects labor rights. 137 The complaint alleged federal and state authorities
128. SASKIA SASSEN, GUESTS AND ALIENS 144-45 (1999).
129. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a),
101 (a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (2006).
130. See generally 8 U.S.C.§ 1188 (2000).
131. See COMPA, supra note 46, at 36-38.
132. Of course, some guestworker programs in technology can lead to the worker staying
permanently, if the employer sponsors the worker and has an ongoing need for the labor. See
DANIELS, supra note 108, at 256-57.
133. See CHAC6N & DAVIS, supra note 120, at 139-47 (discussing the Bracero program).
134. Philip L. Martin & Michael Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Guest Workers, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 117, 129.
135. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a),
101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
136. DAVID TAJGMAN & KAREN CURTIS, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A USER'S GUIDE
(Intemational Labour Office ed., 2000).
137. See U.S. Department of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) (2006), http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/




"have failed to implement and effectively enforce the labor laws applicable
to agricultural workers under the H-2A program." '13 8 In April 2005, the
Brennan Center for Justice and the Northwest Worker Justice Project filed a
NAALC complaint, alleging that H-2B workers had been denied the right to
counsel. 139
The complaint process under NAFTA has had mixed results in
enforcing labor standards in North America. 140  Some unions and
nongovernmental organizations have given up on the NAFTA process
because the labor side agreement merely requires NAFTA countries to
enforce their own labor laws, which does not always offer adequate
protection to workers. 14 1 Indeed, the Farmworker Justice Fund complaint
floundered because the United States responded that federal law provided
little coverage to agricultural workers. 142 The NLRA's guarantees of
freedom of association and collective bargaining, for example, do not apply
to agricultural workers. 143 Further, many of the protections for H-2A
workers in North Carolina were based on state law.144 As a result, the
NAFTA complaint did not get past the U.S. Labor Department. 14 5
Possible remedies to address the lack of worker protection might
include giving workers representatives of their own choosing in
negotiations. Legal alternatives might include bringing a claim under the
NAFTA labor side agreement or an international labor rights claims. The
theory of this claim would be that in the negotiations over the guestworker
138. Petition to the National Administrative Office of Mexico Under the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, submitted by the Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y
Campesinos and Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. (2003) (on file with The Journal of Gender, Race &
Justice).
139. The current status of NAFTA petitions can be found at U.S. Department of Labor,
Status of Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC),
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm#iib8 (last visited January 24, 2007).
140. But see Tamara Kay, Labor Transnationalism and Global Governance: The Impact of
NAFTA on Transnational Labor Relationships in North America, Ill AM. J. OF Soc. 715, 742-44
(2005) (discussing the success of global governance institutions such as NAFTA).
141. See Mathew Schafer, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Canada-U.S.
Relations, 30 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 69, 79 (2004) (describing the labor side complaint process and its
shortcomings).
142. See U.S. Department of Labor, Responses to Questions Submitted by Mexico (on file
with The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice).
143. Section 152(3) of the National Labor Relations Act excludes agricultural workers from
the definition of "employee" 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) 1935.
144. See generally Alejandro V. Cortes, The H-2A Farmworker: The Latest Incarnation of
the Judicially Handicapped and Why the Use of Mediation to Resolve Employment Disputes Will
Improve Their Rights, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 409 (2006).
145. See LANCE COMPA, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) AND
THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION (NAALC) 37-58 (Kluwer Law
International, 2001).
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
program, the United States and Mexico are failing to protect the freedom of
association of guestworkers "to establish and join organizations of their own
choosing to further and defend their interests." 146 By not affording
guestworkers a voice in the negotiations over the terms of their work in the
United States, the United States and Mexico also are not promoting the right
of guestworkers to "freely engage in collective bargaining on matters
concerning the terms and conditions of their employment."' 147  Other
international labor rights claims might be brought if the working conditions
of the guestworkers fall below accepted international labor standards. 148 In
these ways, international labor rights standards could serve to de-commodify
labor in the global economy. The commodification problem, however, is
only one aspect of the challenge of raising and enforcing labor standards for
workers in the global economy.
The Northwest Workers Justice Complaint alleging that the H2-B
workers had been denied their statutory right to counsel is still under review
by the DOL. 149 It may have a better chance of succeeding than other
complaints because of the statutory denial of access to counsel, but the
NAFTA complaint process will provide formidable challenges. 150 Despite
the obstacles presented by the NAFTA complaint process, H-2B workers
have utilized other avenues to challenge deprivations of worker rights.15 1
The Southern Poverty Law Center ("SPLC") in Montgomery, Alabama has
brought several cases to vindicate the labor rights of H-2A and H-2B
workers in recent years, primarily challenging abuse of seasonal forest
workers in Montana as well as violations by the Del Monte food company
against H-2A agricultural workers. 152 These lawsuits, as well as numerous
146. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1499.
147. Id.
148. For example, guestworkers in the United States would have the opportunity to file an
action under the Alien Torts Claims Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000). For a discussion on how
these actions could be brought, see Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic
Enforcement ofInternational Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 533-43 (2001).
149. U.S. Department of Labor, Memorandum in Support of Petition on Labor Law Matters
Arising in the United States (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/
nao/submissions/2005-01 memo.htm.
150. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 ("None
of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal Services Corporation shall be expended for any
purpose prohibited or limited by, or contrary to any of the provisions of, sections 501, 502, 503, 504,
505, and 506 of Public Law 105-119 . . ."); 45 C.F.R. § 1626 (2006) (recipients of federal legal
assistance funds may "provide legal assistance only to citizens of the United States and eligible
aliens").
151. For status on the complaint, see U.S. Department of Labor, Status of Submissions
Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), http://www.dol.gov/ilab/
programs/ nao/status.htm#iib7 (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
152. For complaint summaries, see Southern Poverty Law Center, Hector Luna, et al. v. Del
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personal interviews of H-2B workers conducted by the SPLC, tell a story of
exploitation and threats of retaliation or harm.153 Several workers stated that
they were told that they would not be recruited to work again in the United
States if they refused to drop the lawsuit. 154
All of these abuses exist in temporary programs that, on paper, have
strong worker protections. 155 These programs show the inherent difficulty in
enforcing rights of guestworkers because of their lack of voice in their own
working conditions. In considering expanding guestworker programs, the
lessons of the existing H-2A, H-1B, and H-2B programs should be closely
examined. While there may be a place for a truly temporary and seasonal
worker program, the reality of the abuses of these programs shows that they
are more often used to maintain a cheap, compliant work force. If the United
States has true labor needs in certain occupations, employers in these
occupations are likely to persist and call for workers with residency, if not
citizenship, so that the workers have a political voice.
C. Objections to Expanded Guestworker Programs
The language of the current debate makes clear that guestworkers are
being viewed as disposable workers. What Edward R. Murrow said about
migrant workers in his 1960 documentary Harvest of Shame is also true of
many temporary workers: "They are the slaves we rent."' 15 6 This quote
highlights the moral problems with "importing" predominantly nonwhite
workers into the country to do jobs that predominantly white Americans will
not do. 157
A number of policy and economic objections to guestworker programs
Monte Fresh Produce (Southeast), Inc., http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket/files.jsp?cdrlD=57&
sortlD=0 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) (alleging wage violations by Del Monte); Southern Povery Law
Center, Federico Salinas-Rodriguez v. Alpha Services, Inc., http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket/
files.jsp?cdrlD= 48&sortlD=3 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) (discussing "minimum wage and overtime
protections, and other violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act");
Southern Poverty Law Center, Rosiles-Perez, et al. v. Superior Forestry Service, Inc., http://www.
splcenter.org/legal/docket/files.jsp?cdrlD=56&sort ID=OSPL (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) (discussing
the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and Seasonal Workers Protection Act).
153. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, BENEATH THE PINES: STORIES OF MIGRANT TREE
PLANTERS 14-15 (2005) available at http://www.splcenter.org/images/dynamic/main/ijp-.beneath
thepines-web.pdf.
154. Id.
155. For example, guestworkers in the H-2B program must be paid the prevailing wage. See
8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H)( ii)(b) (2000) (the H-2B provision); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iv) (2006).
156. Harvest of Shame (CBS television broadcast 1960).
157. For a further discussion of the moral objections to guestworker programs, see
Stephanie Franklin, 'Jobs that Americans Won't Do' Filled By Desperate Migrants, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
17, 2005, at 1.
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can also be raised. 158 This Article will briefly survey these objections and
the arguments used to oppose them in the following sections. President
Bush's desired guestworker program, as articulated as recently as the State
of the Union address in January 2007, would be a three- to six-year
temporary program subject to all labor and employment laws.1 59 This
Article will then turn to how guestworker programs, even subject to labor
protections, are inconsistent with legal protections against commodification.
1. Policy and Political Objections
Guestworker programs have often been criticized as bad policy.' 60
Along these lines, many scholars argue that guestworker programs do not
fulfill their stated objectives. 16 1 Besides not always working properly,
guestworker programs also represent a failure of the political process.16 2
Often, labor needs have been addressed based on the political power of the
various constituencies rather than actual labor needs. Hence, agricultural
worker programs are one of the few sectors of the economy to have
temporary worker provisions. 163 Thus, the programs represent capture of the
machinery of government by powerful moneyed interests. Further, the
interests of workers, both in the United States and in other countries, are lost
in the equation. In this way, these programs further the democracy deficit
between workers and their governments. When the programs skew actual
labor market needs, they negatively affect the workers in the host countries.
When the actual conditions of workers are not as promised, the workers in
the sending countries suffer. Guestworker programs thus represent a failure
of the vision of the political system as more than a plutocratic process for
doling out benefits to powerful corporate interests.
164
158. See Samuelson, supra note 86 (arguing against expanded guestworker programs).
159. See Michael R. Triplett, White House Outlines Immigration Reforms, Including
Guestworker Programs, Worker IDs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, Jan. 24, 2007, at A-13.
160. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 86; Martin & Teitelbaum, supra note 134.
161. See Samuelson, supra note 86; Martin & Teitelbaum, supra note 134.
162. See Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and Historic
Perspectives on the AgJobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417 (2005) (describing how the
legislative debate over the AgJobs Bill of 2003, seeking to increase the number of workers in
agriculture, failed to meet the needs of both farmworkers and growers).
163. See PHILIP MARTIN, MANOLO ABELLA & CHRISTINE KUPTSCH, MANAGING LABOR
MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 55-82 (2006) (describing highskilled guestworker
programs); PHILIP L. MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED: UNIONS, IMMIGRATION AND THE FARM
WORKERS 53-54 (2003) (describing how the political power of agriculture lead to temporary worker
programs).
164. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Would Give Illegal Workers Broad New Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2004, at 1; H.G. Reza, Bush Plan No Migrant Lure, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at 1;
Leonel Sanchez, Latinos Split on Bush's Immigration Plan, Citing Repatriation Provision, SAN
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The end of the Bracero Program resulted in many of the workers
involved in the program working illegally in non-agricultural areas of the
economy.165 This might show that a new, expanded guestworker program
would reduce the flow of undocumented workers into the United States. Or,
it might mean that workers hired into the United States for one purpose
might eventually be working for an entirely different employer than the one
for which they were originally hired. Unfortunately, the phenomenon of
migration is complex and belies easy solutions. There is no guarantee that
new guestworker programs would prevent people from trying to immigrate
if they found the requirements too onerous, or if the limits of the program
are reached, as has been the case with the H- lB and H-2B workers.16
2. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Consent and
Full Personhood
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution states: "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude . . .shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction."'167 The Amendment was passed in 1865
to end the practice of chattel slaveholding by private parties, but it had a
much more expansive promise. 16 8 First, the Thirteenth Amendment applies
directly to private action.1 6 9 Further, neither consent nor payment for the
worker's labor necessarily means that a labor relationship does not violate
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against slavery.170
The end of chattel slavery in the United States under the Thirteenth
Amendment represented the legal de-commodification of labor by giving
workers a voice in their conditions of work and the opportunity to exit
oppressive relationships. 17 1 The importance of the Thirteenth Amendment
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 30, 2004, at A3; Alan Zarembo, Garment Laborers Say Bush Guest-
Worker Plan an Ill Fit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at Al.
165. CHAC6N & DAVIS, supra note 120 at 146-47.
166. ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 256-57 (2004) (showing that the H-1B cap was increased for fiscal
years 1999 and 2000).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
168. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World-
Organizing Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 651, 671-74 (2004) (arguing
that the conditions of undocumented wokers in the United States may be violations of the Thirteenth
Amendment).
169. Id.
170. See id.; Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global
Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1047-49 (2002) (arguing that the conditions of workers
employed by U.S.companies abroad may be a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment).
171. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM
51-52, 79-80 (2004) (discussing the application of the Thirteenth Amendment to labor rights).
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was not lost on the progenitors of the modem labor movement when they
argued that Congress could protect freedom of association and collective
bargaining under the authority of section two of the Thirteenth
Amendment. 172 While Congress instead used the Commerce Clause as the
basis for the right to collective bargaining in the NLRA, labor's broader
vision of the Thirteenth Amendment is being looked to again today as a
means of redressing the conditions of some of the most aggrieved workers in
the global economy. 173
The Thirteenth Amendment challenge to guestworker programs also
faces substantive obstacles. First, the Amendment does not protect the right
to associate and bargain collectively, although many of the progenitors of
the NLRA sought to ground those rights in the Thirteenth Amendment.
174
Second, the Supreme Court has held that the threat of deportation is not
sufficient to constitute "involuntary servitude." 175 Nevertheless, several
scholars are arguing for a broadened concept of the Thirteenth Amendment
to include these concepts, and constitutional history shows that their
interpretation may eventually prove correct. 176
A frequent justification of guestworker programs is that the participants
in such programs freely choose to be part of them. 177 The consent of
desperate workers in the global economy should be closely interrogated.
While the prospect of working in the United States for some period of time
and then retuming to their home countries might be appealing to some
workers, other potential "guestworkers" have many family members in the
United States and would like to immigrate permanently. In either case,
adding workers without rights can only increase the democracy deficit.
172. See generally James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941
(1997) (detailing the history of labor's use of the Constitution before the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act).
173. See JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, "IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION": THE RIGHT TO
STRIKE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 195-96 (2005) (grounding the right to strike in
the Thirteenth Amendment). See generally James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing for an expanded use of the Thirteenth Amendment, as opposed to
the Commerce Clause, to enforce labor and human rights).
174. See Pope, supra note 173, at 7 (discussing the debate over whether to ground the
NLRA in the Thirteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause).
175. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (holding that the employer's
ability to frustrate the employees' immigration application was not involuntary servitude under the
Thirteenth Amendment).
176. See Pope, supra note 173; Ontiveros, supra note 168, at 679-80.
177. See Carens, supra note 109, at 106.
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3. Democracy Deficit Problems with Guestworker Programs
In analyzing guestworker programs, it is important to exercise caution
about the limitations of democracy theory. The right to vote, for example, is
not the sine qua non of democratic participation. In Spring 2006, millions of
people, including many noncitizens, marched in reaction to various
Congressional proposals to change immigration laws. 178 Their activism may
have had a major impact on the shape of the bill that was passed by the
Senate, which included an earned legalization program and lacked many of
the most draconian components of the House of Representatives'
immigration bill. 179 It remains to be seen whether the large public
demonstrations will have an overall positive or negative impact on any
immigration legislation. The influence of the recent demonstrations, despite
the inability of immigrants to vote, however, shows that there are many
ways to influence policy democratically. 180
As many have discussed, the merits of any guestworker program
include a possible decrease in the number of migrants who die trying to
cross the desert in the inhospitable Arizona deserts. 181 It is not clear,
however, whether all of the would-be illegal crossers would use a
guestworker program, nor whether a program could accommodate them all.
Despite implementation of a guestworker program, the most important
variable in border deaths would likely continue to be the ways that border
authorities push migrant flows to areas where the chance of capture is
smaller. 182 Thus, the effects of a guestworker program on border en-
forcement are hard to quantify.
D. International Labor Rights: The (Missing) Connection between ILO
Principles and Guestworker Programs
Guestworker programs may violate international labor standards, but
178. See HING, supra note 3, at 9.
179. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess.
2006); see also Immigration and the 2006 Election, BACKGROUNDER (Nat'l Immigration Forum,
Washington, D.C.), available at http://www. inmnigrationforum.org/ documents/TheDebate/Civic
Participation/2006VoteAnalysis.pdf (last visited February 2, 2007).
180. See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
268-73 (2005); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007) (on file with The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice); Edward Rubin, Getting Past
Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 724 (2001) (analyzing different forms of democratic
participation).
181. Leslie Berestein, Border Deaths on Record Pace, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22,
2006, at Al ("During fiscal year 2005, 472 people are known to have died attempting to cross the
border illegally, making it the deadliest year on record.").
182. HING, supra note 3, at 3.
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
there has been little thought about how to square guestworker programs with
international labor standards. In one sense, only domestic standards are
relevant because the guestworkers will be working entirely within the United
States. Nevertheless, the international nature of these transactions call for
more attention to the international standards to which the United States and
Mexico have agreed. First, both the United States and Mexico are members
of the ILO.' 8 3 In 1998, the ILO promulgated four basic rights that were
conditions of ILO membership in its Fundamental Declaration. These rights
are: (1) freedom of association and collective bargaining; (2) freedom from
forced labor; (3) the elimination of child labor; and (4) freedom from
discrimination. 184  These rights are also protected in various ILO
conventions, which members can choose to ratify.1 85 Conventions 87 and 98
protect freedom of association and collective bargaining, and though the
United States has not ratified either of these conventions, Mexico has
ratified both of them. 186 The United States has also committed itself to the
principle of freedom of association in other conventions that it has ratified,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1
87
The NAFTA also contains freedom of association and collective
bargaining as principles that each of the three NAFTA countries shall "strive
to promote."' 188 While the precise nature of this obligation is unclear, it
seems to lay the groundwork for a North American labor law regime. Other
principles that the countries should strive to promote are directly relevant to
guestworkers. Article III of NAFTA requires the three countries to treat
migrant workers the same as native workers in respect to labor law
enforcement. 189 These rights are directly relevant to guestworkers but as
183. For a list of International Labour Organization member countries, which includes the
United States and Mexico, see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (Oct. 5,
2006).
184. International Labor Organization, Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, http://
www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.INDEXPAGE?varilanguage=EN (last visited
Nov. 17, 2006).
185. See International Labor Organization Convention No. 87, Concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; see also
International Labor Organization Convention No. 98, Concerning the Application of the Principles
of the Right to Organize, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
186. See International Labor Organization, Ratifications of ILO Convention 87,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C087 (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
187. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 22, § 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; Maria Pabon Lopez, The
Intersection of Immigration Law and Civil Rights Law: Noncitizen Workers and the International
Human Rights Paradigm, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 611, 628 (2006) (applying International Labour
Organization principles to noncitizen workers' rights).
188. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Annex 1, Sept. 14,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
189. Id. atart. 11(1)(3).
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shown below, it is very unlikely that the federal or state governments will be
able to effectively enforce these laws as required by the NAFTA labor side
agreement.
IV. GIVING VOICE TO GUESTWORKERS
A. Recent Guestworker Proposals
In the current debate over immigration reform, the question of what
labor rights would be afforded to guestworkers has gone largely unanswered.
In proposing a temporary worker program on January 7, 2004, President
George W. Bush stated that he wanted to see Congress pass a temporary
worker plan because it would be a more "compassionate" way for
immigrants to work legally in the United States: "Decent, hardworking
people will now be protected by labor laws, with the right to change jobs,
earn fair wages, and enjoy the same working conditions that the law requires
for American workers."' 190 As history shows, however, even when rights are
granted on paper, they are often not available in practice. The failures of the
Bracero Program are evidence of the gap between law on the books and law
in practice. 191
The House of Representatives took the opening salvo in immigration
reform in December 2005 by passing H.R. 4437.192 The bill did not contain
a temporary worker program, nor did it contain any way for the estimated
eleven to twelve million unauthorized migrants in the country to regularize
their status. 19 3 Instead, it called for mass deportations, a fence running the
length of the U.S.-Mexico border, and for making all undocumented
migrants in the country felons. The House bill was the product of many
Representatives acceding to the concerns in their districts about the impact
of illegal immigration. 194 Massive street protests took place in cities
throughout the country in Spring 2006, focusing on the draconian impact of
H.R. 4437, and calling for broad based immigration reform. 195
In the wake of the House bill, various senators crafted bills that attempt
190. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks on a New Temporary Guestworker Program
(Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html.
191. See infra Part III.A.
192. Fawn Johnson, House Passes Enforcement Only Bill Containing No Guestworker
Language, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Dec. 20, 2005, at AA-I.
193. Report Supplement, Legislation, Lawmakers to Revisit Unfinished Business, Pension,
Business, Immigration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, Jan. 17, 2006, at S-5 [hereinafter Report
Supplement].
194. See Johnson, supra note 192.
195. See H[NG, supra note 3, at 9.
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to do more than the enforcement-only approach of the House. 196 The Senate
passed S. 2611 on May 25, 2006, which included an "earned legalization
program" that would lead to citizenship for many of the estimated eleven to
twelve million unauthorized workers in the country. 197 The Senate bill
ultimately went nowhere in the then-Republican controlled House. 198 As
passed by the Senate, however, S. 2611 provided no additional labor
protections for the estimated 200,000 temporary workers who would come
into the United States each year.' 99 On May 23, 2006, the Senate rejected
Senator Edward Kennedy's amendment to S. 2611 that would enhance
enforcement of labor protections for guestworkers and all U.S. workers. 200
These workers would be brought to the country on a three-year visa,
renewable one time, to work in any sector where there are "willing
employers." 20 1 This would greatly expand the current temporary worker
programs in agriculture and high tech industries. The congressional debate
over immigration proposals in Spring 2006 shows that guaranteeing labor
rights for guestworkers is not a priority in any legislative proposal for
immigration reform. 20 2 In fact, the bill the Senate passed in April 2006 calls
for guestworkers in the new H-2C program to have the same "working
conditions that are normal to workers similarly employed in the area of
intended employment." 20 3
One of the major distinctions in the various bills is whether the
guestworkers will be able to petition for permanent residency on their own
or whether an employer must sponsor them. 2 04 Guestworkers in the new H-
2C program would be able to adjust their status to permanent resident after
196. See Report Supplement, supra note 193.
197. Seeid.,at37-38.
198. Fawn Johnson, In Signing Border Security Measure, Bush Calls for Guestworker
Program, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 193, Oct. 5, 2006, at A-10 (explaining how a comprehensive
immigration bill was blocked by House Republicans in favor of the border fence bill).
199. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess.
2006).
200. See Republican Policy Committee Urges Removal of Wage Language, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 13, at A-I l (July 17, 2006) (referring to a proposal on enhanced wage protections that
was rejected in the final bill).
201. See With Caveats, House Hearing Witnesses Express Support for Guestworkers, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at A-I (July 19, 2006).
202. See Eric Lekus, Senate Approves Plan to Create System Requiring Electronic
Verification of New Hires, Daily Lab. Report (BNA) No. 100, May 24, 2006, at AA-1 (discussing
the defeat of Senator Kennedy's amendment to the Senate Bill 2611, which would have required
increased labor protections for guestworkers brought to the United States under the bill).
203. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S.2611, 109th Cong. (2d Sess.
2006).
204. HING, supra note 3, at 36.
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four years in the program, regardless of their employer's sponsorship. 20 5
Guestworkers in the program less than four years would have to petition
through their employer. The H-2C program would allow workers to change
to other employers within the program.
206
B. The Problem of Enforcement: The Hoffman Story
Even if labor rights are granted in new immigration legislation, the
major difficulty will be enforcement. The temporary nature of the workers
makes it more difficult to enforce these rights.207 Consider the case of Jos6
Castro, the fired worker in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.20 8 In that case, Castro was terminated for
his union activities at Hoffman Plastic Compounds in 1989.209 One of the
other employees laid off in alleged retaliation for union activities filed a
charge with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") in 1989, and the
NLRB filed a complaint against Hoffman in 1990.2 10 After a hearing in
April 1990, an NLRB Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that the
company had retaliated against Castro for his union activities. 2 11
The ALJ's finding was largely upheld by the NLRB in Washington,
D.C. in January 1992.212 At the hearing in June 1993 to determine the
amount of back pay Hoffman owed Castro as a result of his unlawful firing,
Castro admitted that he was unauthorized to work in the United States and
had used a fake birth certificate to obtain employment.2 13 The ALJ denied
205. See id. at 38 (discussing S. 2611).
206. See id. at 31 (discussing S. 2611).
207. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 129 (arguing that guestworker programs can
lead to fewer workplace rights).
208. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
209. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Workers, in LABOR LAW STORIES
399, 408-09 (Laura Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (describing the fact that Jose Castro was
indisputably fired for his union activities); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions:
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, The New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making
Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-20 (2003) (describing how the goals of the NLRA
are often viewed by courts as less important than other statutory schemes when construed with other
statutory schemes); Jennifer C. Chang & Christopher Ho, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII
Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 485-92 (2005) (examining the way in
which Hoffman will affect the remedies available under other employment statutes).
210. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLR3, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
211. Id.at 141.
212. Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 209, at 411.
213. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc,, 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994).
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back pay based on Castro's admission of his unauthorized status.2 14 The
NLRB General Counsel appealed the case through the internal Board
process, eventually leading the five-member appellate Board to decide in
1998 that Castro should not have been denied back pay. 2 15 The General
Counsel moved to enforce the order in the D.C. Circuit, which, after a three-
judge panel and an en banc hearing, decided that Castro's status did not
preclude him from back pay.2 16 The Supreme Court order reversing the D.C.
Circuit did not come until March 27, 2002.217 By that time, Castro had
waited thirteen years to find out what the remedy would be for his unlawful
firing: the employer would have to post a notice and know that the next
violation would be punishable by contempt proceedings. 2 18
Jos6 Castro's case is not unique. An average of one in every twenty
workers in the United States is fired for trying to organize a union.2 19
Employer resistance to unions has grown steadily since Ronald Reagan fired
the Air Traffic Controllers in 1981 .220 As a result, the number of workers
represented by unions has decreased to about 8% in the private sector, even
though union representation is higher in the public sector, at 36.5%. 22 1 Even
when workers are able to organize a union at their workplace, they are often
stifled by the employers in negotiation of the contract, with only about half
actually securing a first contract after winning the right to bargain. 222 If the
employer violates its legal obligation to bargain with the majority of its
employees, the NLRB can order the employer to bargain in good faith.22 3 As
the Hoffman case shows, these remedies can take years to enforce.224 This
deficit of democracy in the workplace affects both documented and
214. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 141.
215. Id. at 142.
216. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 232, (D.C. Cir. 2000).
217. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 137.
218. Id. at 152.
219. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1781(1983).
220. There is some debate about whether or not Reagan's firing actually spurred more
employer resistance to unions. See Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's Fragile Freedom of Association Post-
9/11, 8 U. PA.J. LAB. &EMP. L. 283, 314-17 (2006).
221. BLS Reports Percentage of Workers in Unions Still 12.5 Percent, But Overall Numbers
Up, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at AA-I (Jan. 23, 2006).
222. See Gordon R. Pavy, Winning NLRB Elections and Establishing Collective Bargaining
Relationships, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 110, 111-13 (Sheldon
Friedman et al. eds., 1994) (describing the gap between winning NLRB elections).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
224. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984) (a worker's availability to work




Recent rulings of the NLRB also make it more difficult to organize
temporary workers because they cannot be placed into the same bargaining
unit as permanent workers without employer consent."' In 2000, the NLRB
held in MB. Sturgis that the Board could not certify a bargaining unit that
contained both temporary and permanent workers without the employer's
consent.2 26 The decision was based on the wide latitude that the NLRB had
in determining appropriate bargaining units under Section 9(b) of the
NLRA. 227 Four years later, however, the composition of the Board changed
and a majority of its five members had been appointed by President George
W. Bush.228 In 2004, the Board overruled MB. Sturgis in H.S. Care,
L.L. C. 2 2 9 The Board held that the NLRA does not allow for joint employer
bargaining units without employer consent, in this case a bargaining unit of
employees of the temporary staffing agency and the regular employees of
the employer using the staffing agency. 230 The decision will affect any
attempts to organize guestworkers if they are matched with willing
employers through international staffing companies.
In the current climate for organizing, it is unrealistic to think that
guestworkers have the same rights as other workers to organize unions.
Indeed, even if they did, that would not be sufficient to have real leverage to
bargain with their employers. If guestworkers are dependent on their
employers to petition to change their legal status, they are likely to be
unwilling to enforce labor rights that they have. Even if workers could
petition for resident status in the United States, under the current Senate
proposal they would have to work as guestworkers for four years before
having that ability.231 While the Senate's immigration bill would allow
guestworkers to change jobs, this is not the touchstone of voice on the job,
but rather exit.232 This will do little to improve conditions for other
225. Recent decisions of the NLRB have constricted the definition of "employee." See
Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (2004) (graduate students are not employees eligible for
collective bargaining); Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., Case 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2006) (one of the
"Kentucky River cases" which held that charge nurses are not employees).
226. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000).
227. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1935).
228. See National Labor Relations Board: NLRB Board Members, http://www.nlrb
gov/about.us/overview/board/index.aspx (click on board member to display biography) (last visited
Nov. 17, 2006).
229. H.S. Care, L.L.C., 343 NLRB No. 76(2004), 2004 WL2681621.
230. Id.
231. See Eric Lekus & Heather M. Rothman, Senate Votes to Keep Path to Citizenship in
Proposed H-2C Temporary Visa Program, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, May 22, 2006, at AA-1.
232. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE & LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO THE DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 33-34, 55 (1970) (arguing that in many cases voice is a
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guestworkers or to prevent the same conditions from repeating themselves at
a new workplace. Alternative ways of providing voice to these global
temporary workers are needed.
C. Alternate Models to Give Guestworkers Greater
Voice at their Workplaces
Guestworker programs may not be workable within the current system
of collective bargaining, marked by long delays in the time it takes for the
resolution of claims of unfair labor practices. There are new models,
however, that might mitigate the negative effects of temporary status. One of
these is the pact between the Farm Labor Organizing Committee in North
Carolina ("FLOC"). In 2004, the FLOC reached an agreement with the
North Carolina Growers Association to advocate on behalf of workers in the
H-2A program.233 The pact seeks an end to alleged blacklisting against
workers who sought to enforce their rights. 234 Another example is the
United Farm Workers Union ("UFW") pact with Global Horizons. In April
2006, the UFW entered into an agreement with Global Horizons, a Southern
California labor contractor that matches temporary workers with
employers. 235 The new arrangement was timely and necessary, apparently,
because of an existing federal probe into Global Crossing's abuses of H-2A
workers in Hawaii that resulted in a $300,000 settlement.236
The FLOC and UFW campaigns to represent H2-A workers highlight
the important role that unions and nongovernmental organizations can play
in closing the democracy deficit. These programs are incomplete, however,
since much of the role of unions today is not simply to bargain for an
increase in material conditions but also to involve its members in noncitizen"citizenship" activities such as demonstrations and political education.237
Guestworkers should utilize the NAFTA labor side agreement process
and international forums to challenge the lack of worker protections and
inability to exercise freedom of association. Indeed, the ILO and the North
more effective mechanism than exit).
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American Agreement on Labor Cooperation have recently focused more
seriously on the issue of migrant workers. 238 While these forums are not
ideal avenues for quick resolution, they do provide an international spotlight
on labor violations that are truly international since the workers themselves
are at a democracy deficit in the sending and receiving countries. In this
regard, as other scholars have recently written, international administrative
legal structures may help to close the global democracy deficit.2 39 With
respect to guestworkers, there may be a need for an administrative structure
specifically created to review claims against employers.
In the end, guestworkers may gain some protection and voice through
agreements with non-governmental organizations and use of international
administrative structures. The temporary nature of the programs will always
prevent full realization of any rights that are guaranteed. Thus, any new
labor immigration program should provide unskilled workers with the option
to petition for permanent residency. The expansion of temporary worker
programs would only further commodify workers in the global economy
through the loss of democracy both at their workplaces (through the inability
to enforce their rights) and at the ballot box (through a lack of influence with
legislators and government officials).
V. CONCLUSION
On October 26, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Secure
Fence Act of 2006, authorizing a 700-mile fence along the U.S.-Mexico
border. 240  The bill represents the end of legislative efforts for
comprehensive reform in 2006, but it does not contain most of the draconian
elements of H.R. 4437.241 While the prospects for reform are unclear in the
new Congress, the debate over immigration reform in 2006 shows that the
idea of a guestworker program has broad political appeal. 242 Because of the
malleability of the term "guestworker," elements of many proposed
guestworker programs may appeal to a variety of different political
constituencies. For many employers, guestworker programs mean a steady
supply of labor.24 3 For some immigrant advocates it may mean a safer,
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program).
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better way for immigrants to migrate to the United States. 244 These are both
worthy, necessary goals, but there may be other ways to accomplish them,
such as through legalizing the estimated twelve million undocumented
workers already here, and through increasing the number of regular visas in
all unskilled labor categories and enforcing labor standards.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the immigration bills in Congress, it
seems reasonably clear that United States' reliance on guestworker programs
will continue in some form or another. If there is no new guestworker
program, it is likely that the existing guestworker programs in agriculture,
seasonal work, and high technology will be continued and expanded.
Temporary worker programs with no chance of permanent residency in the
United States should be resisted. As this Article has argued, the expansion of
guestworker programs will inevitably exacerbate the democracy deficit, lead
to more worker abuses, and lead to a greater number of people without voice
over the terms and conditions of their work. The lack of voice both at work
and in the political process for guestworkers, and the history of labor abuses
in such programs, commodifies the workers involved.
The brutal needs of persons who migrate to survive must also be
considered.2 4 5 Temporary worker programs provide some economic relief to
people all over the world, even if on a temporary basis. This Article argues
that in order for the transaction to be as fair as possible, guestworkers need
to work in concert with organizations in the United States, organizations in
their own countries, or both. Ideally, guestworkers would maximize their
bargaining power through collective action and the clear needs of U.S.
businesses for their labor. In reality, though, as in most situations where
there is a surplus of labor, the hiring entities (here, American corporations
utilizing immigration law) maintain a great degree of leverage and workers
are left to "take it or leave it." 24 6 For this reason, unless guestworkers can
leverage their apparent economic power to seek better conditions, temporary
labor programs will necessarily commodify workers.
The free labor system guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment is at
odds with guestworker programs. The ability to quit at any time is illusory if
that means that you will be deported. °Worse still, these workers are unable to
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exercise meaningful voice over their working conditions. Thus, guestworker
programs exacerbate the democracy deficit that already exists for
noncitizens and other temporary workers in the United States. Unless
temporary workers have the option and ability to stay in the country, they
will be unable to exercise the rights that are apparently guaranteed to them
on paper. Without voice, these workers will be little more than objects of
trade in the global economy.

